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Abstract 
The immune self is our reified way to describe the processes through which the 
immune system maintains the differentiated identity of the organism and itself. 
This is an interpretative process, and to study it in a scientifically constructive way 
we should merge a long hermeneutical tradition asking questions about the nature 
of  interpretation,  together  with  modern  understanding  of  the  immune  system, 
emerging sensing technologies and advanced computational tools for analyzing the 
sensors' data.  
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1. A philological prelude 
The online Etymological Dictionary [http://www.etymonline.com/] teaches us that 
the root of "self" is "separate, apart", which means that the Proto Germanic source 
of the sign "self" designating "one's own person, same" is grounded in the activity 
of producing a "difference that makes a difference" (Bateson, 2000).  
The first definition of "self" in the Oxford English Dictionary teaches us another 
important  lesson  about  the  way  in  which  the  meanings  of  signs  have  evolved 
through the rather short period of our cultural evolution. The OED defines self as: 
"A person's essential being that distinguishes them from others, especially consi-
dered as the object of introspective and reflective action" (emphasis mine). While 
the Proto Germanic source says nothing about "essence", the OED's definition is a 
product of reification in which the most basic activity of constituting a difference 
that makes a difference turns into a mysterious essence, which is also the object of 
introspection and reflection by another no less mysterious "essence". This essen-
tialist definition of the self could have not been produced other than in Europe, 
where  the  monitoring  and  regulating  function  of  the  Catholic  Church  has  been Immune System, Immune Self 
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replaced by an internal compass, a super-ego that introspects and reflects on man's 
soul, which is in its turn "self-conscious" in a very unique European and Protestant 
sense.  
One  may  question  of  course  this  "cultural  relativism"  in  which  the  meaning  of 
"self" is determined by a symbolic network of a given historical period. Why do we 
need this cultural relativism one may ask? Can we imagine a person without a self? 
Can we imagine a person without motivation? or consciousness? Can we argue that 
people  got  their  self  only  when  this  term  has  been  baptized  in  the  Protestant 
Churches of Europe? The naive realist may further use the doomsday weapon: The 
analogy to Newton's law of universal gravitation. Do you believe, he may poignant-
ly ask, that Newton's law existed only after Newton had formulated it? Did apples 
fall differently before the brilliant Sir Isaac formulated the law in mathematical 
terms? You would probably not offer such a foolish argument, so why argue that 
the  European  culture  has  invented  something  that  probably  exists  in  each  and 
every human being? My dear naive realist, we may reply, haven't you realized the 
difference between an apple and a human being? While an apple exists "in and for 
itself" a human being thinks, is motivated, and behaves according to the intricate 
symbolic Web in which s(he) is woven. As argued by Bakhtin, we are all unique but 
never alone, and as we are always interacting with others who bring us to the 
world and frame our perspectives, we are obliged to reflectively acknowledge the 
schemes that frame our mind. For the ancient Greek the most powerful motivating 
force was the code of honor. Was he "motivated" the same as the rational capitalist 
who considers his motivation in terms of maximizing profits? The answer is prob-
ably "No" and the reason is that the ancient Greek did not behave indifferently to 
the cultural frames that guided his behavior and the understanding of his beha-
vior. 
This short philological prelude in a paper that deals deal with the immune self 
does not aim to propagate a form of cultural relativism that I totally reject, but to 
reflectively and critically point to the cultural and contextual nature of the con-
cepts that guide and mediate our intellectual activity. There couldn't be a serious 
discussion of the "immune self" without taking into account the cultural evolutio-
nary baggage through which the concept of "self" has acquired its different senses. 
 
2. The immune self: What and How 
As the concept of the "immune self" has been the subject of intensive theoretical 
analysis,  I  have  no  intentions  whatsoever  to  review  this  literature  but  only  to 
present a modest perspective on the immune self. Following my previous work on 
the subject (Neuman, 2008), I will in large try to avoid the "what" question (What is 
the immune self?) as this question almost inevitably leads to the essentialist pitfall. 
Instead, I will try to propose to conceptualize the immune self in a way that may be 
theoretically intelligible and at the same time relevant for producing new research 
questions. As suggested by Efroni and Cohen (2003), a scientific theory should not AVANT Volume III, Number 1/2012 www.avant.edu.pl/en 
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be judged only by one limited criterion, which is its ability to answer scientific 
questions, but also by its ability to produce new research questions. Adopting a 
non-conventional organismic metaphor I may say that similarly to an organism, an 
idea should not be studied only by the solutions it represents in face of evolutio-
nary forces, but also through the potential promise it presents as a source of reno-
vation and resilience for the generations to come. 
Let me start by returning to the old original sense of "self" as an activity of produc-
ing a difference that makes a difference. If we adopt this sense then we do not 
make "a categorical error in assigning human description to lymphocytes and an-
tibodies" (Tauber, 1996, p. 8). Tauber's criticism against the anthropomorphism of 
the "immune self" may be relevant if we apply the modern protestant sense of the 
self to the immune system. However, if we adopt the old idea of the self as a boun-
dary constituting activity, then there is no categorical error in using the concept of 
"self” for describing the activity of lymphocytes and antibodies, as these are com-
ponents that clearly play a role in constituting and maintaining certain boundaries 
essential for the survival of the organism as a differentiated unit of activity. One 
should notice that this idea does not involve a circular argument as it involves a 
conceptual shift between several realms or logical types. The self is the "organism's 
systemic closure that defines it for all practical reasons as a differentiated unit of 
activity/analysis" (Neuman, 2008, p. 96). Without our pre-theoretical observation 
that  certain  objects  exist,  and  therefore  are  differentiated  from  the  rest  of  the 
world, we can have no theoretical discussion whatsoever. Given the existence of 
certain objects we can ask how they come to be differentiated in our mind, which 
is an epistemological/psychological question, and how do they come to be differen-
tiated in the world regardless of our contemplation. In other words, the second 
question is a kind of ontological question. While nonliving entities exist "in and for 
themselves" as described by Husserl, organisms continuously struggle to actively 
maintain their differentiated existence. Each and every organism struggles on a 
daily basis and from one moment to another to constitute and maintain its diffe-
rentiated existence. 
As  we  can  see  from  the  above  discussion,  a  minor  shift  in  semantics  has  clear 
pragmatic consequences. If the self signifies the activity of boundary constitution, 
then the question is not "What is the immune self?" but "How does it work?" Here 
again we meet a version of the essentialist concept suggesting that there is an built-
in genetic barcode that allows the immune system to maintain the boundaries of 
the organism and to constitute its systemic closure. Like a can of beans in the su-
permarket, each and every organism, according to this genetic reductionist expla-
nation, has a well-defined barcode, a fingerprint that signifies its unique identity 
and is used for differentiating the organism from other organisms. Such a genetic 
barcode (the MHC for instance) may play a certain role in constituting systemic 
closure the same as a person's name signifies a certain aspect of his identity. How-
ever, the genetic barcode cannot fully explain the systemic closure of the organism 
and its identity the same as a person's name may designate him but cannot be mi-Immune System, Immune Self 
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sinterpreted as his identity. The sign is never the signified. In fact, the genetic re-
ductionist perspective of the immune self echoes some naive, even primitive one 
may argue, mythical concepts identifying the sign with the signified. The horror of 
mentioning the devil's name, in some cultures, results precisely from this concept 
and the idea that pronouncing the devil's name might bring the ripper to the scene. 
The genetic reductionist concept is wrong even for the simple fact that our body, 
for instance, hosts a wealth of microbial life that cannot pass the barcode criterion. 
Moreover, even some parts of our self cannot simply pass the barcode test. A trivial 
example that I use in my book concerns the tolerance of the male body to sperm 
cells. Sperm cells are produced in the male's body long after his immunological 
identity, whatever it is, has been established in childhood. These "newcomers" are 
not simply tolerated by the immune system because they have the genetic barcode 
of the self. A testicular trauma such as kicking someone in his balls may lead the 
immune system to identify the sperm cells as associated with infection and to at-
tack them regardless of any identity card they may hold. In the dynamic and sym-
biotic context of the living organism, the barcode model is too rigid for explaining 
systemic closure, the same as the identity of a city cannot be explained by the fact 
that only those holding a certificate identifying them as citizens of the city are al-
lowed to enter and live there. Such a policy would have prevented us from hosting 
E. coli in our colon despite the valuable symbiotic relations that we maintain with 
this bacteria. In other words, and as Darwin teaches us, the organism is a dynamic 
thing. A rigid essentialist form of identity would have banned any change, symbiot-
ic relations, or contextual flexibility, which is of prime importance. Well argued! 
declares the reductionist, so let's throw the immune self and just leave the ... non-
self. This is precisely the suggestion underlying Burnet's Clonal Selection Theory 
(CST). Burnet suggests a very appealing idea according to which lymphocytes with 
reactivity against host components are destroyed and therefore the immune sys-
tem identifies and attacks only the non-self. The idea is appealing in a very basic 
sense: An immune system that recognizes the "self" is in danger of attacking its self 
and therefore evolution has naturally produced an immune system blind to its self 
but sensitive only to the non-self. As we know, there is no army without an enemy 
but for Burnet the immune system is an army without a homeland to defend. The 
only minor problem with Burnet's appealing thesis is that it is wrong. As argued by 
Cohen (1994), the immune system knows to recognize itself. Cohen convincingly 
presents this thesis and as an alternative introduces a dialogical approach accord-
ing to which self and non-self are complementarily represented in the immune 
system. There is no self without non-self and vice versa. The theoretical challenge 
to be addressed is how this delicate balance between the self and non-self is dy-
namically and contextually created and maintained. Here we get to the idea that 
the immune system is a meaning-making system (Neuman, 2004). 
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3. The immune system is a meaning-making system 
The challenge facing the immune system is not a mechanical challenge of matching 
a key to a lock, a receptor to an antigen. This powerful lock-and-key metaphor 
cannot explain the complex behavior of the immune system (Cohen, 2000; Neu-
man, 2008). The challenge as I see it is a challenge of interpretation, of meaning 
making. To explain this point I will use natural language. However, by describing 
the immune system as a meaning making system I do not simply adhere to a lin-
guistic metaphor. I don't use the conceptual metaphor: The immune system is like 
natural language. In contrast, I argue that meaning making in its different forms 
underlies both the activity of the immune system and of natural language. To ex-
plain this idea let me start with the polysemy of the sign. Signs in natural language 
can be polysemous, meaning that they can have different senses in different con-
texts. For instance, Bass can be used to describe a kind of Fish but also Guitar Bass. 
There is no meaning encapsulated in the sign itself. It is not a barcode, it does not 
correspond to a cherished sense living far away in the realm of Platonic ideas, and 
the form of the sign is arbitrary as insightfully realized by Saussure. Polysemy is a 
defining characteristic of natural sign systems from human language to the im-
mune system, and it inevitably calls for interpretative activity. If the same sign can 
mean different things in different contexts how do we know to assign the proper 
meaning to the sign? The heart of interpretative activity lies in our need to resolve 
this problem of sense disambiguation. However, let us take a step backward in 
order to try and explain why polysemy exists. To explain this phenomenon let us 
recall the seminal work of Zipf (1949). Zipf identified the inherent conflict in every 
act of communication. If I use signs to communicate some meaning then my eco-
nomic and energetic interest is to minimize my effort. This interest does not result 
from ideological laziness. For generations of organisms the world has been (and 
still is) a tough place, a place where resources are not given for free. In this con-
text, a first principle evident in different forms of biological behavior is the optim-
al expenditure of energy. In this context, the "sender" would have preferred to 
communicate all possible intentions, ideas, emotions, or whatever communicable 
in a single word lexicon! Why should the brain be occupied by building, maintain-
ing, and using a large mental lexicon when one can use a single magic word for 
everything? The same is true for sign processes in the biological realm. If an anti-
gen, a virus, for instance, can be described in mechanical terms as a "key" and if it 
has  the  free  choice  to  design  itself,  then  it  would  have  probably  been  like  the 
thieves' famous key that can potentially open every lock. A key that can open every 
possible lock is the same as a single word lexicon that can gain the appropriate 
response with a minimal expenditure of  energy. The  problem is  the conflicting 
interest of the "receiver" who would like to invest the minimal amount of energy in 
interpreting the sign. Trying to understand the meaning of a single word lexicon 
would have consumed enormous effort of mapping the sign into all possible enti-
ties and actions in the world. For the receiver, the interest is clear: a sign for every 
possible signified entity and action. This demand is unrealistic due to the effort 
required from the sender to hold an enormous, even astronomical, lexicon con-Immune System, Immune Self 
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taining, for instance, different signs for the "I"; the "I" that denotes the person I am 
now but also the person I was yesterday when my mood was different, and so on. 
The same is true for the immune system. If the receptor site could have been ana-
logically described as a lock, then this lock should have been a rigid pattern that 
can easily identify any vicious intruder. In fact, the antibody does have a more 
rigid part, a fixed "lock", but this is only a part of the story as the flexible part of 
the antibody is necessary in order to follow the rapid pace in which the various 
potential  antigens  change  their  "lock"  in  order  to  survive.  In  this  evolutionary 
game between the conflicting energetic demands of the "sender" and "receiver", 
the polysemy of the sign is a kind of resolution between the two extreme positions. 
I don't argue that this is an agreed, rational, and conscious result of a social con-
tract between 'receivers' and 'senders' in the biological realm and emphasize the 
fact that the same biological agent may function both as sender and as receiver. 
However, we can definitely consider the polysemy of the sign, in both the realm of 
natural language and the realm of immunology, as an optimal solution emerging 
under the constraints of the interlocutors’ conflicting interests. The price of this 
optimal and emerging solution is the need to interpret the sign-in-context. Think 
about this evolutionary game in the context of host and parasite relationships. The 
host and the parasite mutually recognize each other. The interest of each of the 
interacting parties is to recognize the other with minimal effort while making sure 
their social contract of mutual support is still valid. For instance, the parasite may 
present to the host a single biological signature identifying him as one of the good 
guys. However, such a position would have demanded from the host enormous 
effort in interpreting this sign under changing contextual circumstances. The idea 
is that a single, one-sense signal identifying the parasite as a legitimate guest might 
not be flexible enough to identify it as an unwanted guest in a changing context. 
The solution is that the host and the parasite are woven in a contextual and ongo-
ing web of signs constituting mutual recognition on a moment-to-moment basis. In 
the case of death, for instance, the decomposition of the corpse is mediated by the 
proliferation of microorganisms living in the gastrointestinal tract. Their violent 
transformation is a result of a changing context in the most concrete, albeit semiot-
ic, sense of the term. When the host stops functioning as the comfortable guest 
house that it has been, signs of decay turn the peaceful guests into violent agents. 
In sum, the polysemy of the sign is an optimal solution to the emergence of com-
plex non-mechanical interactions in and between organisms at different scales of 
analysis. In this context, meaning making may be defined as "a process that yields 
the system's differentiated response to an indeterminate signal" (Neuman, 2008, p. 
138). Whenever a biological signal is interpreted in at least two different ways un-
der different contexts then we see meaning making in action. From this definition 
of meaning making, we learn that the immune self, or the contextual and dynamic 
process through which the immune system contributes to the organism's differen-
tiated existence, involves a continuous distributed process of interpretation. The 
contextual aspect of this activity is elaborated in the following section. 
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4. Context: Weaving cues 
Natural language processing has made some impressive achievements in building 
algorithms for Word Sense Disambiguation (WSD). What can we learn from this 
field for better understanding meaning making in the immune system? First, the 
challenge facing the immune system may be basically in differentiating between 
two senses of a sign: Self or Non-Self. In this context, the problem should be simp-
ler than the one of disambiguating the meaning of a sign with more than two po-
tential senses. The situation, however, is far more difficult for the immune system 
as it does not have a predefined dictionary of terms and senses neither an anno-
tated corpus of sentences in which the different senses of a word are identified. 
The immune system therefore has to rely on natural intelligence and reasoning 
from contextual cues. The contextual cues are patterns of co-occurring biological 
signals resembling those that appear in natural language. For instance, if I have to 
disambiguate the sense of Bass in the following sentence: "I ate a bass in the res-
taurant", then the words "ate" and "restaurant" present a minimal context for dis-
ambiguating "Bass" as a kind of fish. In contrast, in the sentence: "The musician 
played wonderfully on the bass during a concert given at the jazz club", the words 
"musician", "concert", and "jazz club" indicate that bass is probably used in the 
sense of a musical instrument. Again, we cannot totally dismiss even in this context 
the other meaning of bass. It is possible, theoretically, that the musician was using 
a bass fish in order to produce sounds of music that amused the audience during a 
fringe jazz concert. However, reasoning to the best explanation would lead us to 
believe that this is not the case. The macrophages are precisely such contextual 
cues. They cannot sense the antigen directly but report the state of body tissues, 
the presence and effect of infectious agents, and the state of activation of nearby 
immune agents. The immunological context is therefore the minimal configuration 
of signaling agents/pathways through which an ambiguous biological agent is iden-
tified  as  either  enemy  or  friend.  This  is  a  dynamic  network  in  which  signal-
ing/communication "votes" for a decision through the converging perspective of 
the immune agents: The T cells respond to the antigen through the MHC but cannot 
respond to the protein's conformation as the B cells do. The macrophages sense the 
context but cannot respond to the conformation and so on. The disambiguation of 
the sign is a complex task in which multiple perspectives converge toward a possi-
ble solution. This idea calls for a contextual analysis of immune system activity 
through tools similar to those developed in Machine Learning and Natural Lan-
guage Processing. What we need is just a way of mapping the different agents in-
volved in an immune response, recording their behavior through the appropriate 
sensors, and analyzing these numerous interactions in order to identify patterns of 
behavior. The development of future sensors for recording the activity of the im-
mune agents would turn this science fiction into science in action. Like the ad-
vances made in Brain Machine Interface, it seems that the challenges facing im-
munology are more "technical", surprising as it may seem, rather than theoretical 
or metaphysical. Immune System, Immune Self 
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5. Back to the immune self 
What have we learned from this rather short journey? The first important lesson is 
the way our cultural schemes frame and direct our understanding. Imagining the 
immune self in terms of some Protestant agency has no benefits for understanding 
the immune system. By presenting this critique, I have no religious critique, á la 
Dawkins,  whatsoever.  However,  imagining  the  immune  self  as  a  Christian  self 
seems to me a wrong conceptualization even for the devoted believer. As with any 
other living system that is deeply involved in self regulation, the immune system 
must have a representation of the "self". As we  have learned from cybernetics, 
there is no regulation without a model. This model must involve a representation 
both of the requested values the system strives to maintain and those values the 
system should definitely avoid. However, the immune system, as a complex natu-
ral  system,  is  different  from  the  man-made  thermostat.  Its  model  of  the  self  is 
complex, fuzzy, and dynamic, the same as the complementary notion of the "non-
self". The immune self is our reified way to describe the processes through which 
the immune system maintains the differentiated identity of the organism and it-
self. This is an interpretative process, and to study it in a scientifically productive 
way we should merge a long hermeneutical tradition asking questions about the 
nature of interpretation, together with modern understanding of the immune sys-
tem, future technologies for sensing the system, advanced computational tools for 
analyzing the sensors' data. These together with good common sense may keep us 
targeted on the real nature of the immune system rather than going astray after 
our reified fantasies of the nature of our own selfhood. 
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